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INTRODUCTION
Technology-enhanced surveillance encroaches on virtually every
aspect of our daily lives.1 Video cameras routinely record our actions
1. See, e.g., Jay Bookman, Technology: In Your Face: The Ways Surveillance
Equipment Can Scan, Tape, Track and Profile You, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 25, 2001, at
Dl (noting that as the price and size of surveillance equipment falls we will soon be living
in a "watched world").
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in public areas, business establishments, and the workplace.2 Our use
of the Internet is monitored and tracked,3 which may lead to the
release of personal information to third parties.4 Even mundane,
everyday tasks, such as going through the checkout line at the grocery
store, are subject to some type of surveillance.5 Law enforcement
agencies also increasingly rely on technology-enhanced surveillance
to obtain evidence of criminal behavior.6 For example, municipalities
use video cameras to monitor for criminal activity in targeted
neighborhoods7 and for traffic violations at intersections and along
the roadways.8
Some commentators view such everyday surveillance as an
invasion of privacy;9  however, other technology-enhanced
2. See, e.g., Andrew Zipern, Surveillance: When Big Brother Is Watching, A Device
Watches Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at G3 (noting that the average worker in New
York City is recorded by video surveillance more than seventy times a day).
3. See Shawn C. Helms, Translating Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. Sci. &
TECH. L. 288, 290 (2001) (discussing the loss of anonymity in cyberspace).
4. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1463
(2000) (arguing that the state and private sector now enjoy unprecedented abilities to
collect personal data).
5. See Steven E. Brier, Smart Devices Peep into Your Grocery Cart, N.Y. TIMES, July
16, 1998, at G3 (discussing technologies 6sed by supermarkets to track consumer
purchases).
6. See generally Gregory S. Fisher, Cracking Down on Soccer Moms and Other
Urban Legends on the Frontier of the Fourth Amendment: Is it Finally Time to Re-Define
Searches and Seizures?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 137, 149-50 (2002) (summarizing the use
of potentially invasive high-technology devices in law enforcement); Roberto Iraola, New
Detection Technologies and the Fourth Amendment, 47 S.D. L. REV. 8, 9-15 (2002)
(discussing new technologies aimed at detecting weapons, explosives, drugs, and persons);
Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for Covert
Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1023-38 (2001) (reviewing
surveillance technologies that the government, including law enforcement agencies, is
currently using or developing).
7. See, e.g., Kim Cobb, Police Cameras Worrying Watchdogs: Focus May Be On
Safety, But Privacy Concerns Also High, HOUS. CHRON., July 15, 2001, at 1A (describing
the use of video surveillance coupled with facial recognition software to identify wanted
criminals from a crowd of people in public areas).
8. See, e.g., James F. Sweeney, The All-Seeing Eye: Growing Number of Surveillance
Cameras Sparks Big Brother Privacy Debate, PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 6, 2002, at Li
(discussing the proliferation of surveillance cameras, including those at traffic
intersections). See generally Andrew W.J. Tarr, Recent Development, Picture It: Red
Light Cameras Abide by the Law of the Land, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1879 (2002) (describing the
use of electronic cameras at intersections to detect drivers who run red lights).
9. See, e.g., Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video
Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 295, 326 (1999) (arguing that the use
of video and other new surveillance techniques invades personal privacy); cf Susan
Bandes, Power, Privacy and Thermal Imaging, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1379, 1388 (2002) (noting
that it is conceivable that technology can offer greater protection of privacy); William C.
Heffernan, Criminal Law: Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. &
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surveillance devices proposed for use by law enforcement agencies
are potentially more intrusive." For example, the government is
developing surveillance devices that emit radar waves capable of
penetrating solid objects, such as brick walls, to detect hidden
contraband or criminal suspects." The Federal Aviation
Administration is currently testing a full-body X-ray machine called
"BodySearch" that can detect objects hidden under clothing, but also
produces revealing images of the human anatomy. 2 Devices that
passively detect wavelengths in the millimeter portion of the
electromagnetic spectrum are also being developed to detect
concealed weapons.13 Ordinary video cameras can be modified with
off-the-shelf infrared optical components to allow the viewer to "see"
through clothing. 4 More sophisticated infrared-based, thermal-
imaging technology is also being proposed for use as a lie-detector
test to screen passengers in airports. 5 Although the terrorist attacks
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 101 (2002) (noting that people welcome technological innovations for
the efficiencies that they offer everyday life and that technology can also serve as a shield
for privacy); Jeffrey Rosen, A Watchful State, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at 6-38 (noting
that the general public in Great Britain supports the widespread use of video surveillance
systems).
10. See Mike Snider, Technology Offers a Feeling of Security, USA TODAY, Nov. 15,
2001, at 1D (describing surveillance technology proposed for use in airports and along
U.S. borders).
11. For information regarding such technology under development, see United States
Department of Justice, at http://www.nlectc.org/virlib/.
12. See AS&E, BodySearch Personnel Inspection System, at http://www.as-e.com/
products/pr-bt.body.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter AS&E, BodySearch Personnel Inspection System] (describing the
BodySearch Personnel Inspection System for screening individuals for the presence of
concealed weapons, drugs, and illegal contraband).
13. See Charles J. Murray, Picking Up the Pieces, ELEC. ENGINEERING TIMES, Sept.
17, 2001, at 1 (describing millimeter wavelength detection systems and their proposed use
for airport security).
14. See Naked to the World: Cameras Let Voyeurs See Through Clothes, at
http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/gma/goodmorningamerica/gma l087xray cameras-
hunter.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(describing an infrared video camera that allows users to see through people's clothes).
Although private citizens use this technology for voyeuristic purposes, law enforcement
could potentially use it to detect weapons or contraband concealed under clothing. Such
law enforcement use might be deemed constitutional if these modified video cameras are
considered to be "in general public use." See infra note 28 and accompanying text
(quoting the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001)).
15. See Jill Burcum, Seeing Through the Mask of Deceit: A Lie Detector Using
Thermal Imaging May Be a Way to Screen for Terrorists at Airports, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 3, 2002, at Al (describing the potential application to airport
security of a lie-detector device that identifies deceitful people by measuring the heat
emitted from their faces).
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on September 11, 2001, raised awareness of the need for improved
technologies for airport security, 6 the government has contemplated
the use of these devices to detect concealed weapons and contraband
for several years.17
The common thread among these technology-enhanced
surveillance techniques is that they each detect a form of
electromagnetic radiation. 8 Because these devices are designed, in
principle, to conduct a "search," their proposed use has raised Fourth
Amendment concerns. 19  Although the Supreme Court has
acknowledged that advances in technology have affected the degree
of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment,2" the Court has
previously reserved judgment regarding how much technological
enhancement of ordinary perception is too much.21 In Kyllo v. United
States,22 however, the Court recently confronted the question of "what
limits there are upon [the] power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy" under the Fourth Amendment.23
Like the proposed surveillance techniques discussed above, the
technology at issue in Kyllo, a thermal imager, discretely detects a
form of electromagnetic radiation without the subject being aware of
the surveillance.24 Because thermal imaging and other surveillance
devices under development exhibit technological similarities, one
commentator hoped the Court's resolution of the thermal-imaging
case in Kyllo would provide guidance for law enforcement use of
16. See Charles J. Murray, Wanted: Next-gen Tech for Weapons Detection, EE TIMES,
Sept. 14, 2001, at http://www.eetimes.com/printablearticle?docid=OEG20010914S0035
(on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (describing the potential use of milliwave
detection technology in airport security).
17. See George Dery III, Remote Frisking Down to the Skin: Government Searching
Technology Powerful Enough to Locate Holes in Fourth Amendment Fundamentals, 30
CREIGHTON L. REV. 353, 354-58 (1997) (describing new technologies that perform the
equivalent of a frisk, but without physically touching the body).
18. Electromagnetic radiation includes radiation ranging from cosmic rays to radio
frequencies, including X-rays, visible light, and infrared radiation. See generally HUGH D.
YOUNG, FUNDAMENTALS OF WAVES, OPTICS, AND MODERN PHYSICS (2d ed. 1976)
(explaining the basic concepts of electromagnetic radiation).
19. See generally Dery, supra note 17 (discussing Fourth Amendment implications of
remote frisking technologies).
20. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (stating that technology
enabling human flight has exposed portions of the house and its curtilage that once were
private).
21. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (reviewing the Court's
treatment of the effect of advances in technology on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
22. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
23. Id. at 34.
24. See infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (describing thermal imagers).
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other radiation-detecting devices.2 5  Thus, some commentators
predicted that Kyllo would be one of the most important cases heard
by the Court in 2001.26
The Court in Kyllo, however, specifically addressed the narrower
issue of "whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a
private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat
within the home constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. ' 27 In so doing, the Court limited the scope of
Kyllo to surveillance of the home, holding in a 5-4 decision that
"where ... the Government uses a device that is not in general public
use, to explore details of [a private home] ..., the surveillance is a
Fourth Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant."2 Although the Court's decision in Kyllo is at first
blush a victory for individual privacy rights against the government's
use of technology-enhanced surveillance devices, this decision
actually may set the stage for an erosion of Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches.29
This Comment suggests that Kyllo's holding limits Fourth
Amendment protection from technology-enhanced surveillance
devices to the home and therefore does not apply to other such
devices currently in use or proposed for use by law enforcement
officials for searching individuals outside the home. This Comment
also argues that the Court's reasoning is short-sighted because it
adopts a standard that only affords Fourth Amendment protection
from high-technology surveillance devices that are not in general
25. Dery, supra note 17, at 379-83 (comparing the legal analysis of millimeter-
wavelength detection technology cases with that of thermal-imaging cases).
26. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Law Enforcement and Criminal Law Decisions, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 517, 532 (2001) (stating that the Fourth Amendment cases, including Kyllo,
promise to be some of the most important of the Term); Tony Mauro & Jonathan Ringel,
Justices Not Hot on Thermal Imaging, RECORDER, Feb. 21, 2001, at 1, (noting that an
American Bar Association panel highlighted Kyllo as an important case for setting
constitutional rules on high-tech surveillance devices); William P. Weiner, Is the Thermal
Imaging of a Home an Unreasonable Search, a Reasonable Search or Not a Search at All?,
at www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/features/kyllo-us.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) (suggesting that, because Kyllo deals with the
conflict between personal autonomy and privacy and the governmental desire to obtain
information, it will have an impact beyond whether thermal-imaging evidence should be
admitted or suppressed in a criminal case).
27. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
28. Id. at 40.
29. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term: Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306, 356
(2001) (concluding that the rule emerging from Kyllo erodes the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection) [hereinafter Leading Cases]; Fisher, supra note 6, at 169
(concluding that Kyllo could erode an individual's privacy rights).
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public use. Furthermore, this Comment asserts that the Court
misapplied the analytical framework of Katz v. United States,30 a flaw
that could limit the precedential value of Kyllo in future Fourth
Amendment cases.
Section I presents the facts surrounding Kyllo and a brief
description of thermal-imaging technology. Section II provides an
overview of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence on technology-
enhanced surveillance devices. Section III discusses Fourth
Amendment doctrines adopted by the lower courts in deciding
thermal-imaging surveillance cases. Section IV provides an overview
and analysis of the Court's decision in Kyllo. Finally, Section V
applies the Court's rationale in Kyllo to other high-technology
surveillance devices.
I. FACTS OF KYLLO AND A DESCRIPTION OF THERMAL-IMAGING
TECHNOLOGY
Federal law enforcement agents suspected that Danny Kyllo was
growing marijuana in his unit of a residential triplex.3' Growing
marijuana indoors requires the use of high-intensity lamps that emit a
significant amount of heat, which is typically vented outside to
maintain an optimal temperature in the building for growing
marijuana.32 Early one morning, agents scanned the triplex with a
thermal imager,33 a device that has become commonplace in drug
eradication efforts,34 to determine if the amount of heat emanating
from Kyllo's unit was consistent with the use of such lamps.35
30. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz is discussed in detail in Section II, infra notes 71-77 and
accompanying text.
31. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that a law
enforcement task force investigating other targeted suspects began to suspect that Kyllo
was involved in a conspiracy to grow and distribute marijuana), cert. granted, 530 U.S.
1305 (2000), rev'd and remanded, 258 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
32. Id. at 1044; see Douglas A. Kash, Prewarrant Thermal Imaging as a Fourth
Amendment Violation: A Supreme Court Question in the Making, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1295,
1296 (1997) (explaining that the high-intensity lamps required for indoor marijuana
growing operations can generate temperatures exceeding one hundred degrees
Fahrenheit, whereas the optimum temperature for growing marijuana is about sixty to
seventy degrees); Carrie L. Groskopf, Comment, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: The
Supreme Court's Unnecessary Departure from Precedent in Kyllo v. United States, 52
DEPAUL L. REV. 201, 205-07 (2002) (providing an overview of the pervasive use of
marijuana in the United States, law enforcement's attempts to combat such use, and use of
indoor growing operations to avoid detection).
33. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044; see also infra notes 36-41 and accompanying text for a
description of thermal imagers.
34. See Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DUKE L.J. 787, 867 (1999)
(stating that "for a number of years, the government has utilized 'thermal imagers' to
2003]
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A thermal imager is a passive monitoring device-it emits no
rays or beams.36 Thermal imagers operate like ordinary video
cameras except that they detect and record infrared radiation instead
of visible light.37 A thermal imager converts infrared radiation into
images that are displayed on a black and white video monitor.3" The
shades of these images correspond to relative temperature: black is
cool, white is hot, and shades of gray indicate relative temperature
differences.39 Thermal imagers are very sensitive to changes in
temperature; for example, they can detect temperature differences as
small as one-tenth of a degree Celsius.n° Although the image
recorded by a thermal imager is relatively crude, a thermal imager
produces discernable images of objects in its field of view including
humans."n
The thermal-imaging scan of Kyllo's unit showed that the
temperatures of a side wall and the roof over the garage of his unit
were substantially higher than that of the neighboring units in the
triplex. 42 Based on the thermal-imaging data, the agents concluded
that Kyllo was using high-intensity lamps to grow marijuana in his
search private residences for illegal drug cultivation"); Tracy M. White, Note, The Heat is
On: The Warrantless Use of Infrared Surveillance to Detect Indoor Marijuana Cultivation,
27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 295, 295-96 (1995) (noting law enforcement's use of forward-looking
infrared devices to establish evidence of indoor marijuana cultivation).
35. Kyllo, 190 F.3d at 1044 (describing how an agent of the United States Bureau of
Land Management and an officer of the Oregon National Guard used a thermal imager to
examine the triplex of homes where Kyllo resided).
36. In that sense, a thermal imager is a non-intrusive device that does not penetrate
walls. See, e.g., A Primer on Infrared Thermography, at http://www.infraredtraining.com/
itctechnicalnotes/infraredprimer.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (describing how thermal-imaging devices work).
37. All objects emit infrared radiation. See Paul Walorski, What is Infrared, at http://
www.ipac.caltech.edu/Outreach/Edu/infrared.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review). The amount of infrared radiation that an object emits is
proportional to its absolute temperature-the warmer the object, the more infrared
radiation it emits. Infrared radiation is invisible to the naked eye. Id. (describing infrared
radiation and comparing it to visible light). Although humans might "see" the effect of
heat radiating from an object, i.e., the "mirage effect," what the eye is actually observing is
a change in the refractive index with respect to temperature and not the infrared radiation
or "heat waves" itself. See What is the Mirage Effect?, at http://www.physlink.com/
Education/AskExperts/ae428.cfm (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
38. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29-30 (2001).
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Thermography Infrared Camera/Prism DS, http://www.x20.org/thermal/
prismds.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(describing specifications of an infrared imaging camera).
41. Id. (providing examples of images recorded by an infrared imaging camera).
42. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S.
1305 (2000), rev'd and remanded, 258 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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home.43 Relying on records of utility bills, tips from informants, and
the thermal-imaging data, a magistrate judge issued a search warrant
for Kyllo's home.' When agents executed the search warrant, they
found an indoor-growing operation involving more than one hundred
marijuana plants.45
A federal grand jury indicted Kyllo on one count of
manufacturing marijuana." At trial, Kyllo moved unsuccessfully to
suppress the evidence seized from his home, entered a conditional
guilty plea and was sentenced to a prison term of sixty-three months
7.4
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing
regarding the intrusiveness of thermal imaging.4 On remand, the
district court upheld the validity of the warrant that relied, in part, on
the thermal-imaging data and reaffirmed its denial of Kyllo's motion
to suppress.49 A divided court of appeals initially reversed,50 but that
opinion was withdrawn5' and the panel, after a change in composition,
affirmed the district court.52  The U.S. Supreme Court granted
certiorari during the October 2000 term.53
43. Id. (noting that the agents based their conclusion on an inference from the
thermal-imaging results).
44. Id. at 1043-44.
45. Id. at 1044.
46. Id.
47. Id. The trial court's denial of Kyllo's motion to suppress was upheld on appeal.
See United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787, 792 (D. Or. 1992) (denying Kyllo's motion to
suppress the thermal-imaging evidence); see also United States v. Kyllo, 809 F. Supp. 787,
794 (D. Or. 1993) (upholding, on reconsideration, its earlier order denying Kyllo's motion
to suppress).
48. United States v. Kyllo, 37 F.3d 526, 530-31 (9th Cir. 1994) (remanding the case to
the district court for findings on the technological capabilities of the thermal imager,
including whether the thermal imager "can detect sexual activity in the bedroom ... or, at
the other extreme, whether it can only detect hot spots where heat is escaping from a
structure").
49. United States v. Kyllo, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3864 (D. Or. 1996) (finding that,
because the thermal imager recorded only the heat emitted from the home and not
intimate details of the home, it did not intrude on the privacy of the individuals within the
home).
50. United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998).
51. United States v. Kyllo, 184 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
52. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046-47 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that,
because the thermal scan did not intrude into activities within Kyllo's home and Kyllo did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information that the thermal imager
provided, the use of the thermal imager did not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd and remanded, 258 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
53. Kyllo v. United States, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000).
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II. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO TECHNOLOGY-
ENHANCED SURVEILLANCE
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."54  The
threshold question in Fourth Amendment cases is whether or not the
government conduct constitutes a "search"-if that conduct does not
constitute a "search," the Fourth Amendment does not apply." The
Court's definition of a "search" for Fourth Amendment purposes has
evolved through a series of cases addressing the government's use of
sense-enhancing technology. 6 These cases established the Fourth
Amendment doctrine that lower courts have applied to cases
involving thermal-imaging surveillance.57
Courts historically tied Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to
common law trespass.58 The existence of a search, therefore,
depended on whether a physical trespass had occurred.59 When first
confronted with what at the time was a new surveillance technology,
e.g., the wiretapping of telephone lines, the U.S. Supreme Court
adhered to this trespass-based Fourth Amendment doctrine. In
Olmstead v. United States,60 the Court held that the wiretapping of
telephone lines was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because an actual physical invasion of the defendant's
54. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment was adopted in response to the
use of general warrants and writs of assistance, which enabled British soldiers to conduct
wide-scale searches of colonists' homes for contraband. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 624-29 (1886) (discussing the history of the Fourth Amendment).
55. See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: "Second to None in the Bill of
Rights," 75 ILL. B.J. 424, 427 (1987) ("[T]he police conduct in question must constitute
either a 'search' or a 'seizure' as those terms are used in the Fourth Amendment.").
56. See, e.g., Dery, supra note 17, at 358-65 (discussing the evolution of the Court's
Fourth Amendment doctrine as applied to sense-enhancing technology).
57. See infra notes 108-39.
58. See Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942) (holding that use of a
dictaphone to overhear conversations did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
information was not obtained by trespass or unlawful entry), overruled in part by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 457-66 (1928)
(holding that tapping telephones did not violate the Fourth Amendment because no
trespass was committed upon any property of the defendants), overruled in part by Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). But see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-
12 (1961) (holding a technical trespass not necessary for Fourth Amendment violation).
59. See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (noting that no cases to date have found a violation
of the Fourth Amendment unless an actual physical intrusion of the defendant's house or
curtilage occurred for the purpose of making a search or seizure).
60. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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house did not occur.6' Olmstead thus gave rise to the doctrine that
electronic surveillance does not constitute a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes where no physical trespass occurs.6 2 Although
the doctrine articulated in Olmstead was not without its critics,63 the
Court applied it to an electronic-surveillance case fourteen years
later.' In Goldman v. United States,65 the Court applied this doctrine
to hold that the use of a listening device, such as a dictaphone, placed
against the wall adjoining a defendant's office did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because the placement and use of the dictaphone
was not accomplished through a trespass or unlawful entry.66 Thus,
under Olmstead and Goldman, private activities, such as
conversations, in the home or office gave rise to no specific Fourth
Amendment protection so long as a physical trespass was not
involved in observing the activities.
The Court did not always sustain law enforcement's use of
warrantless electronic surveillance under this trespass-based Fourth
Amendment doctrine, however. For example, in Silverman v. United
States,67 the Court held that the police officer's use of a microphone
attached to a foot-long spike violated the Fourth Amendment
because they conducted an unauthorized physical penetration into the
premises occupied by the defendants to accomplish the
eavesdropping, even though the police officers themselves did not
physically trespass on the defendants' property.68 Silverman exposed
61. Id. at 466. In Olmstead, federal prohibition officers inserted wire taps along the
telephone wires running from the basement of a large office building and from the streets
near residences of persons suspected of unlawfully dealing in the liquor trade. The
officers applied the wire taps without trespassing on the defendants' property. Id. at 457.
62. See Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy,
Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 598-616 (1996).
63. See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing
technological advances, such as wiretaps, as "means far more effective than stretching on
the rack" for obtaining disclosure in violation of the Fourth Amendment's protections and
proposing that the Court "adopt a construction susceptible of meeting modern
conditions").
64. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 135-36 (1942).
65. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
66. Id. at 134. The Court refused to distinguish Goldman from Olmstead. Instead,
the Court found no difference between a person using a telephone to project his voice
beyond the confines of his home or office and assuming the risk that the conversation
might be intercepted, and a person talking in his own office, who does not intend for his
voice to go beyond the four walls of the office, and thus does not assume the risk of
someone using a listening device in the next room to overhear the conversation. Id. at
135.
67. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
68. Id. at 506-07. The Court distinguished Silverman from Goldman because the
officers inserted the "spike mike" into the wall separating their observation post from the
2003]
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the inconsistency of the trespass-based doctrine,69 as the Court
adhered to the traditional concept of a trespass and physical intrusion
being necessary for Fourth Amendment violation, but articulated a
new standard by stating that a Fourth Amendment violation arises if
an "actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area" occurs.7"
This new standard, however, was short-lived, as Katz v. United States7
eventually decoupled Fourth Amendment rights from trespass and
property law and rejected Olmstead's trespass-based theory.72
In Katz, FBI agents attached an electronic listening device to the
outside of a public phone booth and recorded conversations that
defendant Katz made to place illegal gambling bets. Justice Stewart,
writing for the Court, proclaimed that "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places."73 Under this concept, "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."74  Accordingly,
"[w]hat he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.""
The Court held that Katz was protected under the Fourth
Amendment because he "justifiably relied" on the privacy of the
telephone booth.76  The test that ultimately emerged from Katz,
however, came from Justice Harlan's concurrence, which requires
"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ,77 In refining this two-prong
test, the Court has subsequently held that a Fourth Amendment
suspect's premises until it contacted a heating duct, thus converting the entire heating
system into a conductor of sound. Id.
69. Although the type of information obtained in Silverman was the same as that
obtained in Goldman, the Court in Goldman held that the officers' eavesdropping was not
a search because their microphone had been placed against a wall on the side opposite the
defendant's office, whereas the Court in Silverman found a constitutional violation where
police used a foot-long microphone to penetrate a party's wall, thereby trespassing on the
private property of the defendant.
70. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 512.
71. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72. Id. at 353; see also Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting
the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303,
1312 (2002) (noting that Katz, by considering the acts of the defendant to protect his
privacy, i.e., shutting the door to the phone booth, represented a departure from Goldman
and Silverman, which only considered the acts taken by the government agents).
73. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (citations omitted).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 351-52.
76. Id. at 353.
77. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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search does not occur unless "the individual manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search" and
"society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable."7
Although some jurisprudence following Katz gave a broad
meaning to the right to privacy, 9 most decisions have diminished
these rights."0  Several cases involving technology-enhanced
surveillance have used the analytical framework from Katz to limit,
rather than protect, Fourth Amendment rights.81 The progeny of
Katz most relevant to the thermal-imaging cases are those decisions
involving visual surveillance. 2
Historically, English law considered visual surveillance to be
lawful because "the eye cannot ... be guilty of a trespass." 3 Visual
surveillance of a home is still allowed under the Fourth
78. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
79. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987) (finding that government
employees have a reasonable expectation of privacy in personal property stored in desks
and file cabinets located on government property); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,
337-40 (1985) (holding that school children have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
personal property and that they do not necessarily waive that right to privacy by entering
onto public school grounds).
80. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 335 (1998) (noting that "the overall
tendency of the Court has been to contract the protected individual interest as a
consquence of modern technological advances and their utilization by the government").
81. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983) (holding that
monitoring signals from an electronic tracking device placed in a container of a chemical
solvent to be used in a drug laboratory did not invade any legitimate expectation of
privacy and did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment because the
monitoring did not reveal any information that could not have been obtained through
visual surveillance); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (holding that the use
of a pen register to record numbers dialed from a suspect's home was not a "search" under
the Fourth Amendment because the suspect had no reasonable expectation of privacy in
the numbers that he voluntarily made available to telephone company personnel). But see
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712-14 (1984) (holding that the installation of an
electronic tracking device in a container of chemical solvent to be used in a drug
laboratory did not constitute a search, but monitoring the signal while the device was in a
private residence violated the Fourth Amendment).
82. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-52 (1989) (holding that visual
surveillance from a helicopter at an altitude of four hundred feet of the interior of a
greenhouse in the backyard of a residence was not a search requiring a warrant under the
Fourth Amendment); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986) (finding
no Fourth Amendment violation where the Environmental Protection Agency engaged in
warrantless aerial photographing of Dow Chemical's manufacturing plant because any
person with access to a camera and an airplane could have taken the same photographs);
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial
surveillance in an age where commercial flights are routine); see also infra Section IV
notes 140-61 discussing the Court's decision in Kyllo.
83. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 628 (1886) (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 95
Eng. Rep. 807 (K. B. 1765)).
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Amendment.84 For example, in California v. Ciraolo,85 the Court held
that "aerial observation ... from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a fenced-
in backyard within the curtilage of a home" did not violate the Fourth
Amendment.86 The Court in Ciraolo reasoned that, although the
defendant had met the subjective expectation of the privacy test
under Katz, his expectation "that his marijuana plants were
constitutionally protected from being observed with the naked eye
from an altitude of 1,000 feet" was unreasonable. 7
Likewise, in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,88 where a
government agency photographed a manufacturing facility with a
precision aerial-mapping camera, the Court held that the use of such
a camera in an area falling somewhere between "open fields" and
"curtilage" did not intrude into the manufacturer's reasonable
expectations of privacy."9 Important to the context of Kyllo, the
Court in Dow Chemical noted that surveillance of private property
with more sophisticated equipment not generally available to the
public might be constitutionally proscribed.9" The Court also
suggested that more detailed surveillance techniques might have led
to a different result, noting that "an electronic device to penetrate
walls or windows ... would raise very different and far more serious
questions."'" The Court in Dow Chemical further found that it was
"important that this is not an area immediately adjacent to a private
home, where privacy expectations are most heightened."92  Three
years after Dow Chemical, the Court narrowed this doctrine by
holding in Florida v. Riley93 that an aerial surveillance of a private
84. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213 (noting that the "Fourth Amendment protection of the
home has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes
when passing by a home on public thoroughfares").
85. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
86. Id. at 209.
87. Id. at 215.
88. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
89. Id. at 239.
90. Id. at 238 (noting that, although the photographs gave the government more
detailed information than naked-eye views, they were not so revealing of intimate details
as to raise constitutional concerns).
91. Id. at 239.
92. Id. at 237 n.4.
93. 488 U.S. 445 (1989). In Riley, an officer, while circling overhead at an altitude of
four hundred feet in a helicopter, observed with his naked eye what he thought was
marijuana growing in a greenhouse on the suspect's property. Id. at 448. Relying on its
decision in Ciraolo, the Court held that observation of the suspect's curtilage from this
vantage point did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 452.
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home that discloses "no intimate details connected with the use of the
home or curtilage" does not constitute a search.94
Cases that did not involve the use of technology-enhanced
surveillance devices, but nevertheless implicated the Fourth
Amendment doctrine articulated in Katz, are also relevant to the
thermal-imaging cases. In United States v. Place,95 the Court held that
use of a trained, narcotics-detecting dog to sniff luggage in a public
place did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment because, in part, the canine sniff discloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics.96 In California v. Greenwood,97 the
Court held that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit the
warrantless search of garbage left for collection outside the curtilage
of the home because society did not accept a subjective expectation of
privacy in the garbage as objectively reasonable.98 Many lower courts
adopted one of these two approaches in analyzing thermal-imaging
cases.
99
The protection the Fourth Amendment traditionally affords
people in their homes is also relevant to the thermal-imaging cases.100
With a few exceptions, warrantless searches of a home are considered
unreasonable and are therefore unconstitutional.10' In contrast, the
Court affords less protection outside the curtilage of the home, 02 a
94. Id.
95. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
96. Id. at 707.
97. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
98. Id. at 40. The Court in Greenwood concluded that, because he left his garbage on
a public street "readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other
members of the public," the defendant abandoned any claim he may have had to Fourth
Amendment protection. Id. at 40-41. Furthermore, because the defendant deliberately
placed his garbage at the curb for the express purpose of having a third party take it, he
would have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the items that he discarded. Id. at 41.
99. See infra notes 113-26 and accompanying text.
100. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that the "right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable government
intrusion" is "at the very core" of the Fourth Amendment).
101. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990) (noting that an exception
to the unconstitutionality of a warrantless entry of a home occurs where voluntary consent
has been given or where a third party possesses common authority over the premises).
102. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding the
government's warrantless physical intrusion into private, open fields was not an
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment because "open fields do not provide
the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is intended to shelter from
government interference or surveillance"). The Court in Oliver concluded that "an
individual has no legitimate expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless
intrusion by government officers." Id. at 181; see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
301-05 (1987) (holding that peering, without a warrant, into a barn to observe a drug
laboratory did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the barn was not within the
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concept that becomes important when considering the scope of the
Court's decision in Kyllo and its hypothetical application to thermal-
imaging cases already decided by lower courts.
Although a thermal imager is technically most related to other
optical devices, such as sophisticated cameras used to conduct visual
surveillance,'1 3 the lower courts did not necessarily follow the progeny
of Katz dealing with the constitutionality of visual surveillance"°
when confronted with thermal imaging cases. Instead, the lower
courts attempted to analogize the information obtained with a
thermal imager to that obtained by sifting through garbage or from a
drug-sniffing dog.' The Court did not follow these strained
analogies and instead focused on the sanctity of the home and
distinguished Kyllo from the visual surveillance progeny of Katz that
dealt with the warrantless observation of, for example, manufacturing
facilities. °6
III. LOWER COURT DECISIONS INVOLVING THERMAL-IMAGING
SURVEILLANCE
Before the Court heard Kyllo,1°7 five circuits, including the Ninth
Circuit, held that the warrantless use of a thermal imager did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.0 8 Only one Circuit, the Tenth, held
that the use of a thermal imager constituted an unconstitutional
curtilage of the home and observations from open fields do not violate any other privacy
expectation).
103. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
104. See supra notes 82-94.
105. See infra notes 113-26.
106. See infra notes 140-61.
107. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
108. See United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (concluding that the
thermal-imaging surveillance did not reveal intimate details so as to violate the Fourth
Amendment), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305 (2000), rev'd and remanded, 258 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th
Cir. 1995) (holding that thermal-imaging surveillance of an occupied home was not an
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1220
(1996); United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 853-57 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
warrantless use of a thermal imager in an "open field" does not violate the Fourth
Amendment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995); United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670
(7th Cir. 1995) (finding that thermal imaging is not a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 879 (1995); United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992,
995-97 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that ground surveillance with a thermal imager of an
unoccupied mobile home on leased land is not an unreasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding
that the warrantless use of a thermal imager did not violate the Fourth Amendment
because the defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat
emanating from his home), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1057 (1994).
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search under the Fourth Amendment."°9 The circuit courts have also
decided several cases involving thermal-imaging on other grounds
without addressing the Fourth Amendment implications of the
thermal-imaging surveillance. 10
The outcome of the thermal-imaging cases in the lower courts
often turned on how the court framed the inquiry in the first prong of
the Katz analysis: (1) whether the defendants retain an expectation
of privacy in the heat radiated from their home or (2) whether the
defendants possess an expectation of privacy in the heat produced
from the activities within their home."' Although the lower courts
typically started their analysis of thermal-imaging cases with the two-
pronged test from Katz,'12 they did not rely exclusively on the line of
cases following Katz that addressed surveillance by electronic devices
or visual surveillance. The lower courts instead generally analyzed
thermal-imaging cases under one of three approaches: waste heat,
canine sniff, or intimate details.
A. Waste-Heat Approach
Under the waste-heat approach, courts draw an analogy between
the heat emanating from a structure in which high-intensity lamps
109. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the surveillance of a home with a thermal imager intrudes upon an expectation of privacy
that society deems reasonable), vacated on other grounds en banc by 83 F.3d 1247 (10th
Cir. 1996).
110. See United States v. Black, No. 99-6117, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 7755, at *18 (6th
Cir. Apr. 18, 2001) (declining to address the constitutionality of the thermal-imaging
surveillance because sufficient evidence to establish probable cause existed without the
thermal-imaging data), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 891 (2001); United States v. Olson, 21 F.3d
847, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding sufficient evidence independent of the thermal-
imaging results to support a finding of probable cause), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 888 (1994);
United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 197 (3rd Cir. 1993) (withholding judgment on the use
of a thermal-imaging device because the rest of the factual evidence would have supported
probable cause to issue a search warrant to determine if marijuana was being cultivated in
a private residence); United States v. Barnett, 989 F.2d 546, 556-57 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding
that, although an officer with limited experience operated the thermal-imaging device
used in aerial surveillance and the readings were questionable, other factual data
supported probable cause for a search warrant to investigate the manufacture of
methamphetamine), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 850 (1993), and cert. denied, 519 U.S. 849 (1996).
111. See James Francis Barna, Note, Reforming the Katz Fourth Amendment
"Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test: The Case of Infrared Surveillance of Homes, 49
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 247, 275-78 (1996) (noting that when a court finds that
a person's expectation of privacy refers to the heat emitted from the home, the thermal-
imaging surveillance is deemed constitutional, whereas, if a court finds that the
expectation of privacy refers to the sanctity of the home, the thermal-imaging surveillance
is found to be unconstitutional).
112. Id. (discussing the application of the Katz test to thermal-imaging cases).
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were being used and garbage left outside of one's home.113 In one of
the first decisions addressing the constitutionality of thermal imaging,
the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii held that
the nonintrusive use of thermal imaging for detecting "waste heat"
did not amount to a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."' In that case, the district court concluded that the
defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
waste heat because she voluntarily vented it outside where it was
exposed to the public and she did not attempt to impede its escape
from the structure.115 Moreover, the court determined that even if the
defendant could demonstrate a subjective expectation of privacy in
the waste heat, such an expectation would not be one that society
would view as objectively reasonable. 16 The Seventh, Eighth, and
Eleventh Circuits have also applied the waste-heat doctrine to
thermal-imaging cases." 7
A criticism of the waste-heat approach is that waste heat, unlike
garbage, can only be detected by a high-tech device." 8 Additional
criticisms of this approach are that, due to the laws of
thermodynamics, dissipation of heat is an inevitable result of heat
113. This approach is based on California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), where the
Court held that the warrantless search of garbage left outside the defendant's home would
violate the Fourth Amendment only if the defendant manifested a subjective expectation
of privacy in his garbage that society would accept as objectively reasonable. Id. at 40-41;
see T. Wade McKnight, Comment, Passive, Sensory-Enhanced Searches: Shifting the
Fourth Amendment "Reasonableness" Burden, 59 LA. L. REV. 1243, 1255-56 (1999)
(discussing lower court decisions that have relied upon the waste-heat approach).
114. United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 228 (D. Haw. 1991), aff'd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth
Circuit initially overruled the "waste-heat" approach in United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d
1249, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy in an indoor
marijuana-growing operation because the thermal-imaging data revealed intimate details
of the home), withdrawn by 184 F. 3d 1057 (9th Cir. 1999).
115. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. at 226.
116. Id. (analogizing heat waste vented outside the home to garbage bags left on the
curb in Greenwood).
117. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 669-70 (7th Cir. 1995) (finding that because
no attempt was made to exercise control over the heat emanating from the home, any
expectation of privacy was unreasonable), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 879 (1995); United States
v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that where the defendant took
affirmative actions to vent excess heat generated by the grow lamps, he did not exhibit a
subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emitted from the structure); United States v.
Pinson, 24 F.3d 1056, 1058-59 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that the warrantless use of a
thermal imager did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the defendant did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the heat emanated from his home), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1057 (1994).
118. State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 186 (Mont. 1997) (stating that waste heat is not as
readily accessible to the public as is discarded garbage).
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production that does not require a deliberate act and the affirmative
act of insulating a building to retain the heat is indicative of a
subjective expectation of privacy in that heat.'19 Based on these
criticisms, one would think that cases where the defendant actively
vents the excess heat (no expectation of privacy) could be
distinguished from those cases where the heat naturally emanates
from the structure (a subjective expectation of privacy) under the
waste-heat approach. The Eleventh Circuit, however, when
confronted with this scenario, declined to make such a distinction.20
B. Canine-Sniff Approach
Some courts have drawn an analogy between thermal imagers
and the use of trained, narcotic-detecting dogs to search individuals
for contraband.'21 This approach has its genesis in United States v.
Place,'22 where the Court held that exposure of luggage in a public
place to a trained, narcotic-detecting dog does not constitute a search
under the Fourth Amendment.'23 Like the use of drug-sniffing dogs,
use of a thermal imager is non-intrusive and does not involve a
physical search of the person.'2 4  A criticism of the canine-sniff
approach is that, unlike trained dogs, a thermal imager does not
discriminate between heat produced by legal and illegal activities.'
119. Id. (noting that the dissipation of heat-is not preventable in the same way that one
can conceal garbage and that no matter how much one insulates a building, heat will still
escape).
120. Compare United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding
no subjective expectation of privacy in the heat generated by an indoor marijuana growing
operation where no steps were taken to prevent the heat from escaping), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1220 (1996), with Ford, 34 F.3d at 995 (concluding that a defendant who punched
holes in the floor of the building and installed a blower to vent the excess heat did not
exhibit a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emitted from the building).
121. See Myers, 46 F.3d at 670 (concluding that, analogous to the scent of drugs
emanating from luggage, society is not willing to protect as reasonable an expectation of
privacy in the waste heat emitted from a home); Ford, 34 F.3d at 997 (finding that the heat
the defendant intentionally vented from his home was a waste byproduct of his marijuana
cultivation and is analogous to scents emanating from contraband in luggage); Pinson, 24
F.3d at 1058 (finding that detecting heat escaping from a home with a sense-enhancing
infrared camera is analogous to detecting odor emanating from a compartment with the
sense-enhancing instrument of a canine sniff).
122. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
123. Id. at 707 (holding that the use of nonintrusive equipment, such as a police-trained
dog, does not constitute a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
124. See United States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991), affd on
other grounds sub nom. United States v. Feeney, 984 F.2d 1053 (9th Cir. 1993).
125. See People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996) (noting that "because
the thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering sources of heat it is an intrusive tool,
which tells much about the activities inside the home which may be quite unrelated to any
illicit activity"); State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 187 (Mont. 1997) (noting that the "flaw in the
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For example, the heat produced in Kyllo's home could have been
emitted from high-intensity heat lamps used to grow legal herbs
instead of marijuana. 126
C. Intimate-Details Approach
The intimate-details approach is derived from dictum in Dow
Chemical Co. v. United States,127 where the Court stated that aerial
photographs taken of an industrial complex were "not so revealing of
intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns.' 1 28 This approach
is an extension of the Katz standard, but examines the content of the
information revealed by the surveillance instead of the means used to
obtain it.129 The Court has often used this approach to limit, rather
than enhance, the expectation of privacy provided under Katz."
Most courts that have relied on the intimate-details approach
determined, by examining the underlying scientific principles of
thermal imaging, that the use of the thermal imager is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment because this technology cannot reveal
any "intimate details" about the activities occurring inside the
home."' Other courts have taken the view, however, that
interpretation of the thermal-imaging data allows the government to
canine-sniff approach is that the thermal imagers provide information about heat
emissions both legal and illegal while canine sniffs only provide information about the
presence of illicit substances"); see also Richard S. Julie, Note, High-Tech Surveillance
Tools and the Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in the
Technological Age, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127, 135-36 (2000) (criticizing the application of
the canine-sniff approach to thermal-imaging cases because heat is naturally emitted by
ordinary, non-criminal behavior, as opposed to the odor emitted by narcotics, which
almost always constitutes direct evidence of a crime).
126. The irony of Kyllo's street address, 878 Rhododendron Drive, in Florence,
Oregon, has not been lost on pundits. See, e.g., George F. Will, Not Too Strict to Apply
Justice, WASH. POST, June 17, 2001, at B7 (noting that Kyllo was not growing
rhododendrons in his home on Rhododendron Drive).
127. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
128. Id. at 238.
129. See Simmons, supra note 72, at 1322-23 (discussing the use of a results-based test
in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
130. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (finding no evidence in the record
showing "intimate details connected with the use of [his] home or curtilage were
observed"); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986) ("Aerial observation of
curtilage may become invasive, either due to physical intrusiveness or through modern
technology which discloses to the senses those intimate associations, objects or activities
otherwise imperceptible to police or fellow citizens.").
131. See United States v. Ishmael, 48 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1995) (concluding that,
because thermal imaging is a "passive, nonintrusive instrument" that does not send any
beams or rays into the area on which it is fixed or in any way penetrates within that area,
no intimate details of the home are observed), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995).
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monitor intimate details of domestic activities that generate a
significant amount of heat.32  Still other courts have found that,
although the use of thermal imaging was not intrusive enough to
trigger a Fourth Amendment violation, more advanced technology
may do so in the future. 33  One commentator feared that the
Supreme Court would adopt the intimate-details approach if it was
confronted with the issue of thermal-imaging surveillance, and
thereby limit an individual's Fourth Amendment protection from
such government conduct.'
D. General Criticisms of the Canine-Sniff and Waste-Heat
Approaches
A general criticism of the canine-sniff and waste-heat approaches
is that both rely on strained analogies between the capabilities of
thermal imaging and some unrelated, non-technological surveillance
technique.'35 Unlike garbage, which can be sifted without the aid of
any sense-enhancing device, the heat produced from high-intensity
lamps in an indoor marijuana growing operation can only be detected
by sophisticated infrared detectors. Also, unlike the use of trained
narcotic-detecting dogs that, in effect, enhance a human's sense of
smell, the use of thermal-imaging equipment provides entirely new
132. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 n.ll (10th Cir. 1995) (noting
the capabilities of thermal imagers to detect human forms and activities), vacated on other
grounds en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); Commonwealth v. Gindelsperger, 743
A.2d 898, 901-02 (Pa. 1999) ("Courts that have ... found the use of thermal imaging
devices to be constitutionally repugnant have done so based upon the conclusion that
these devices do, in fact, reveal intimate details regarding activities occurring within the
sanctity of the home, the place deserving the utmost protection pursuant to the Fourth
Amendment.").
133. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 n.1 (7th Cir. 1995) ("While it is true that
other technology may be, or may become so advanced that it could unlawfully penetrate
the walls of our home or be otherwise unacceptably intrusive, this is not the case before
us.").
134. See Merrick D. Bernstein, Note, "Intimate Details": A Troubling New Fourth
Amendment Standard for Government Surveillance Techniques, 46 DUKE L.J. 575, 578
(1996) (arguing that the Supreme Court's adoption of an "intimate details" standard
would alter "the balance between the government's interest in effective surveillance and
citizens' privacy rights").
135. See Barna, supra note 111, at 278-80 (arguing that such analogies overlook the
fact that infrared devices do more than simply amplify human senses, because humans
cannot see, touch, hear, smell, or taste infrared radiation); see also McKnight, supra note
113, at 1259 (concluding that courts are straining to put a "square peg in a circle" by
applying such analogies); Simmons, supra note 72, at 1343-47 (arguing that a distinction
between "sense-enhancing" devices and "sense-replacing" devices is irrelevant because it
focuses on the method of search, rather than the results of the search).
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information (i.e., the relative amount of infrared radiation) that
cannot be detected directly by the human senses.'36
Although the fundamental differences in the detection
capabilities of thermal imagers make the analogies to waste heat and
canine sniffs strained, the majority of courts that have addressed the
constitutionality of thermal-imaging surveillance nevertheless have
applied one or both of these approaches.'37 In fact, the Ninth Circuit
in Kyllo relied on both the waste-heat and the canine-sniff
approaches in concluding that the use of a thermal imager did not
constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment and that Kyllo did
not have a subjective expectation of privacy in the heat emitted from
his home.'38 The Ninth Circuit also applied the intimate-details
approach to find that, even if Kyllo could demonstrate a subjective
expectation of privacy in the heat emitted from his home, he had not
established that this expectation of privacy would be accepted by
society as objectively reasonable.'39
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN KYLLO
The Court narrowly framed the issue in Kyllo by addressing only
"whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home
... to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a
'search.' "140 The Court further emphasized the sanctity of the home
by asserting that " '[a]t the very core' of the Fourth Amendment
'stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' "I" The Court
reasoned that to withdraw protection of the reasonable expectation of
privacy that exists in the home "would be to permit police technology
to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.'
4 2
136. See supra note 37 (explaining that the human eye cannot detect infrared
radiation).
137. See supra note 113-26 and accompanying text; cf State v. Young, 867 P.2d 593,
603 (Wash. 1994) (rejecting the garbage and canine-sniff analogies).
138. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S.
1305 (2000), rev'd and remanded, 258 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
139. Id. at 1047; see supra notes 127-34 and accompanying text (describing intimate-
details approach).
140. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). The
Court's emphasis on privacy in the home is consistent with the fundamental right to
privacy articulated under due process and equal protection jurisprudence. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-65 (1969) (articulating the right to read or view pornography in
the privacy of one's home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965)
(upholding the right of married couples to use contraceptives in the privacy of the home).
142. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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While the Court recognized the difficulty in applying Katz when the
search of public areas, such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even
the curtilage of residences, is at issue, no such difficulty exists where
the search is of the interior of homes. Along these lines, the Court
in Kyllo found that "obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any
information regarding the interior of the home that could not
otherwise have been obtained without physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area' constitutes a search-at least where
(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use."'
14
Thus, with this analysis, the Court intended to preserve "that degree
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted." 45 On this basis, the Court held that the
information obtained by the thermal imager was the product of a
search.
146
The Supreme Court in Kyllo did not follow any of the three
approaches adopted by the lower courts in thermal-imaging cases. 47
The Court rejected the government's argument that "the thermal
imaging must be upheld because it detected 'only heat radiating from
the external surface of the house.' ",148 To counter this argument, the
majority drew an analogy between the thermal imager capturing only
heat emanating from a home and a directional microphone picking up
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). Application of
this test to the facts in Kyllo indicated that the surveillance amounted to a search because
the thermal imager "reveals the relative heat of various rooms in the home..." which is
"information regarding the interior of the home." Id. at 35 n.2. By quoting this language,
the Court gives credence to the standard articulated in Silverman that the Court declined
to follow in Katz and perhaps signals that the Court is retreating to property-based Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); infra
notes 203-05 and accompanying text.
145. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. But see Bandes, supra note 9, at 1383 (noting that relying on
Framers' intent can be problematic when the particular concerns and expectations of the
Framers' historical time is conflated with the values underlying the Fourth Amendment);
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders' Privacy: The Fourth Amendment and the Power of
Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (arguing that "instead of asking
whether the Founders would have considered the act in question a search, the Court
should ask whether the Founders enjoyed this level of security from government
surveillance and harassment).
146. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35.
147. The Court, if anything, followed most closely the Ninth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Kyllo, 140 F.3d 1249, 1254-55 (9th Cir. 1998), withdrawn, 184 F.3d 1059
(9th Cir. 1999), and the Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d
1497 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds en banc, 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996).
148. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 (citing the Brief for the United States at 26, Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508)). This argument is the focal point of the
dissenting opinion, which asserts that a fundamental difference between "off-the-wall"
observation and "through-the-wall surveillance" exists. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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only sound emanating from a house149 and noted that the mechanical
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment advocated by the
government and the dissent was rejected in Katz, where the
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the
exterior of the phone booth.150 Thus, the majority argued that to hold
otherwise would leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology, including imaging technology that could discern all
human activity in the home. 5' In doing so, the majority adopted a
rule that takes into account more sophisticated systems that are
already in use or under development.'52
The government, relying on Dow Chemical, also contended that
"the thermal imaging was constitutional because it did not 'detect
private activities occurring in private areas.' 1153 In response to this
contention, the majority distinguished Kyllo from Dow Chemical,
because an industrial complex, such as that at issue in Dow Chemical,
does not share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home. 54 The
Court asserted that, in the home, all details are intimate, because the
entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.' The Court
claimed, however, that limiting the prohibition of thermal imaging to
intimate details would fail to provide "a workable accommodation
between the needs of law enforcement and the interests protected by
the Fourth Amendment.' ' 56 In developing this line of thought, the
Court did not draw a connection between the sophistication of the
surveillance equipment and the intimacy of the details that it
149. Id. at 35.
150. The dissent concluded that the thermal imaging did not constitute a search
because "the equipment... did not penetrate the walls of [Kyllo's] home" but instead did
no more than "passively measure heat emitted from the exterior surfaces of [Kyllo's]
home." Id. at 42-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Such an approach, however, is inconsistent
with the teaching of Katz. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.2(d) at 75
(3d ed. Supp. 2002) (noting that the dissent's approach would have produced a different
result in Katz itself).
151. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36.
152. The Court discusses various technologies under development, including a radar-
based, through-the-wall surveillance system, handheld-ultrasound through-the-wall
surveillance, and a radar flashlight that will allow officers to detect individuals through
interior building walls. Id. at 36 n.3. For information regarding such technology under
development, see generally United States Department of Justice, National Institute of
Justice, at http://www.nlectc.org/virlib/.
153. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37 (citing Brief for United States at 22, Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001) (No. 99-8508)).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 37-38 (claiming that under this interpretation, for example, the level to
which Kyllo heated his residence was an "intimate detail").
156. Id. at 38 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984)).
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observed.57 The Court, therefore, declined to enunciate a rule based
on the performance characteristics of a particular surveillance device
because to do so would require it to specify which home activities are
"intimate."158
Ultimately, the Court drew "a firm line at the entrance to the
house" for Fourth Amendment purposes 159 and stated that the line
"must be not only firm but also bright." 160  While the Court
acknowledged the possible conclusion that the thermal imaging in
Kyllo did not significantly compromise the homeowner's privacy, it
purported to "take the long view, from the original meaning of the
Fourth Amendment forward" in holding that "[w]here, as here, the
Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore
details of a private home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [Fourth
Amendment] 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable without a
warrant."16 '
The decision in Kyllo, from a Court that is generally believed to
favor crime-control interests over privacy rights, 62 came as a surprise
to most Court-watchers. 163  The Court also heard six other Fourth
Amendment cases during the same term that it decided Kyllo.1 4
Loosely construed, these six cases break down equally into three
victories for the Fourth Amendment rights of criminal defendants
and three pro-law enforcement decisions. 65 Another surprising
157. Id. The Court acknowledged, however, that the case involved "officers on a
public street engaged in more than naked-eye surveillance of a home." Id. at 33.
158. Id. at 38-39.
159. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 517-18 (noting that over the past few Terms
criminal defendants have prevailed in a surprising number of cases in what is considered to
be a conservative Court with great deference to law enforcement).
163. See David Cole, Scalia's Kind of Privacy, NATION, July 23, 2001, at 6-7
(expressing surprise at the decision in Kyllo from a typically conservative Court). See
generally, Stanley E. Adelman, Safe at Home, But Better Buckle Up on the Road-
Supreme Court Search and Seizure Decisions, 2000-2001 Term, 37 TULSA L.J. 347 (2001)
(reviewing recent Fourth Amendment cases before the Supreme Court).
164. See Charles H. Whitebread, Recent Criminal Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court: The 2000-2001 Term, CT. REV., Summer 2002, at 41, 41-42 (2001)
(reviewing the recent Supreme Court decisions involving an individual's Fourth
Amendment rights in the face of technological advance and law enforcement authority);
see also Chemerinsky, supra note 26, at 517 (noting that criminal defendants prevailed in
two out of the three Fourth Amendment cases heard during the Court's 2000 Term).
165. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 209 (2001) (holding that a military officer who
detained a protester was entitled to qualified immunity from suit, a decision that involved
an issue separate from the Fourth Amendment question of whether unreasonable force
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aspect of these Fourth Amendment cases is the shifting alignments of
the Justices.'66 Unlike other areas of jurisprudence, which have
involved fairly consistent voting patterns,'167 the Court exhibits shifting
coalitions in Fourth Amendment cases. 68  These shifts are
particularly apparent in Kyllo and Atwater v. City of Lago Vista.
169
These odd alliances make the Court's future direction in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence unpredictable.'7 °
was used in the seizure); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 53.2 U.S. 769, 769-72 (2001) (per curiam)
(holding that officers can conduct an inventory of the contents of a car after arresting the
driver for speeding); Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 325-26 (2001) (holding
that police had discretion to arrest and handcuff a person for a minor offense); Ferguson v.
City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (holding that a state hospital testing pregnant
women for drugs and then reporting the results to police constitutes an unconstitutional
search); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 328 (2001) (ruling that police officers who have
probable cause to search a home for easily destroyed contraband can keep a suspect from
entering his own home during the brief time it takes to get a search warrant); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35-36 (2001) (holding that a drug checkpoint with
drug-sniffing dogs violated the Fourth Amendment because the checkpoint's primary
purpose was indistinguishable from general interests of crime control).
166. In Kyllo, a 5-4 decision, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Justices Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29. Justice
Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined. Id. at 41.
167. David J. Garrow, A Reliably Assertive Supreme Court, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 2, 2001, at 9 (stating that in most 5-4 decisions handed down by the present Court, the
narrow majority is comprised of Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, with the minority being comprised of Justices Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer).
168. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, Search Cases Puzzle Experts, NAT. L.J., June 25, 2001, at
Al (noting that the very conservative Justice Scalia wrote the Kyllo opinion, whereas
conservative Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice
Stevens, the Court's most liberal justice, in dissenting from the decision); David G. Savage,
Taking a Page From History: Old English, Colonial Law Revisited in Pot Scanning,
Warrantless Arrest Cases, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2001, at 32 (noting that the Kyllo decision
confounded Supreme Court observers and pundits, not so much for the final outcome, but
because of the odd alliance of the justices, with Chief Justice Rehnquist and the more
liberal Justice Stevens in dissent, joined by swing votes of Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy, who almost alwaysmake up the majority). See generally, Christopher E. Smith
and Steven B. Dow, Criminal Justice and the 2000-2001 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 79 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 189 (2002) (providing an empirical interpretation of the individual
Supreme Court Justices' votes in criminal justice cases, including those involving Fourth
Amendment issues).
169. 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (holding that police had discretion to arrest and handcuff a
person for a minor traffic offense). In Atwater, Justice Souter, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, delivered the opinion of the Court.
Id. at 322.
170. See Coyle, supra note 168 (noting that a pattern in the Fourth Amendment rulings
has not emerged).
2003] KYLLO V. UNITED STATES 753
Law enforcement officials expressed initial disappointment in the
Kyllo decision.1 ' Proponents of the use of thermal imaging in law
enforcement, however, took a more pragmatic approach and viewed
the decision in Kyllo as only requiring officers to obtain a search
warrant before using thermal imagers to scan for heat characteristics
of homes.172 This view is in line with that of the ABA Criminal
Justice Section Task Force on Technology, which recommended
requiring police to obtain a warrant in most investigations where they
want to use high-tech surveillance equipment.'73 In the context of
conducting searches of indoor marijuana growing operations, other
evidence, such as high electric bills and informant tips, is typically
available to support the necessary probable cause to obtain a search
warrant.7 4 Thus, Kyllo does not handcuff law enforcement totally in
the war on drugs-the ultimate effect of Kyllo on law enforcement
171. See, e.g., Glen Elsasser, Odd Court Alliance Voids Police Tactics; Scalia Joins 5-4
Majority Ruling on Heat Detector, CHI. TRIB., June 12, 2001, at 1, (quoting the past
president of the National Association of Chiefs of Police as stating the decision in Kyllo
was "a shock to us"); Jack Dunphy, Scalia Hits a Clinker, NAT. REV. ONLINE, June 22,
2001, at http://www.nationalreview.com/dunphy/dunphy062201.shtml (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (stating that the Kyllo decision denies police officers a
valuable tool in the fight against drugs).
172. Thomas D. Colbridge, Kyllo v. United States: Technology Versus Individual
Privacy, 70 F.B.I. L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 10 (2001) (discussing the practical implications
of Kyllo), available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/leb/2001/october200l/octOlp25.htm
(last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review); Ku, supra note
145, at 1372-73 (arguing that "obtaining a warrant is not a significant burden on law
enforcement" and that it insulates "the search from subsequent constitutional challenge");
David Ruppe, Technology and the Fourth Amendment, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/
us/DailyNews/scotusthermalO10611.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (noting that law enforcement officers have been instructed not to
use thermal imagers without first obtaining probable cause through other means).
173. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Technologically-Assisted Physical
Surveillance: The American Bar Association's Tentative Draft Standards, 10 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 383 (1997) (describing the ABA's efforts to establish guidelines for technologically-
assisted physical surveillance, including surveillance using video cameras, tracking
beepers, telescopic devices, illumination devices, and detection systems, such as thermal
imagers). The ABA recently enacted these standards. See ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE STANDARDS (THIRD):
TECHNOLOGICALLY-ASSISTED PHYSICAL SURVEILLANCE (1999); see also John Gibeaut,
High-Tech Heat Seeking: Warrantless Use of Detection Device Splits Appeals Courts,
A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 34, 35 (discussing ABA recommendations before Kyllo was
decided).
174. See supra note 110 (describing how courts have declined to address the
constitutionality of thermal-imaging searches because other evidence supported the search
warrants).
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might be only to require the extra step of obtaining a search warrant
before scanning a home with a thermal imager.'75
The effect of Kyllo on the Court's future Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, however, might be more profound. In the remainder
of this section, this Comment argues (A) that the Court in Kyllo
deviated from the precedent established by Katz and its progeny; (B)
that the holding in Ky/io is limited to protecting against technology-
enhanced surveillance of the home and should not be applied to
surveillance of subjects in other locations; and (C) that the Court's
adoption of the "in general public use" standard is short-sighted and
provides only temporary protection from technology-enhanced
surveillance.
A. The Court in Kyllo Deviated from Katz and its Progeny
One commentator suggests that one of the most favorable
aspects of Kyllo is that "the opinion is true to the teaching of Katz."'76
Although the Court in Kyllo remained true to Katz and its progeny
by examining whether the thermal-imaging surveillance intruded
upon a justified expectation of privacy under Justice Harlan's two-
prong test, the Court, as it has on other occasions,177 misapplied Katz
and deviated from precedent in the Katz progeny in at least two
significant ways: (1) the Court failed to show judicial restraint when
it protected against "potential, as opposed to actual, invasions of
privacy, '  and (2) the Court did not adequately address whether
Kyllo "knowingly exposed"'79 the heat from the high-intensity lamps
to the public. Although consideration of these factors might not have
175. See Adam Miller, Not Quite up in Smoke: Florida Cops Will Be Slowed, Not
Stymied, By Ruling that Bans Using Heat Sensors to Detect Pot Crops, BROWARD DAILY
Bus. REV., June 20, 2001, at Al (quoting a special prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney's
office in Miami as saying that obtaining a warrant is "an extra hurdle but, in the long run, I
don't think it will have a huge negative impact [on drug enforcement]"); see also Jonathan
Ringel, Search Warrant Necessary to Use Heat-Detection Device, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER,
June 12, 2001, at 4 (suggesting that Kyllo will not hamper police investigations because,
according to detectives, using a thermal imager is normally the last step in an investigation
after the police have used other means, such as informant tips and electricity bills, to
establish probable cause for a search warrant).
176. See LAFAVE, supra note 150, § 2.2(d) at 75 (noting that the most important aspect
of Kyllo is that it addresses "whether there has been an intrusion upon a justified
expectation of privacy, and not (as in the pre-Katz era) whether there had been a physical
intrusion into some protected area").
177. See Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the Twenty-first Century,
65 IND. L.J. 549, 563 (1990) (arguing that the Court has misapplied the exceptions
articulated in Katz to the point that the exceptions have now swallowed the rule).
178. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).
179. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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changed the outcome of Kyllo, the Court's failure to properly address
these issues might ultimately diminish the precedential value of Kyllo
in deciding future Fourth Amendment cases.
By taking into account technology " 'already in use or in
development' "180 the Court in Kyllo protected against "potential, as
opposed to actual, invasions of privacy.' 81 Commentators generally
applaud the Court for having the foresight to limit the use of
technology-enhanced surveillance now, as opposed to waiting until
surveillance techniques become more sophisticated. 2  By guarding
against future, more invasive surveillance techniques, the Court
expanded the Fourth Amendment protection against invasions of
privacy. But in doing so, the Court went against the precedent
established in Karo,183 and failed to exhibit judicial restraint."4 The
Court has never held that "potential, as opposed to actual, invasions
of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment."'85 In deciding Fourth Amendment cases, the Court
should only consider the facts of the case at hand.8 6
By considering the facts in the record from the lower court
decisions, the Court in Kyllo could have reached the same
conclusion-that the thermal-imaging surveillance constituted a
search-without erroneously addressing potential invasions of privacy
from technology under development. The record in Kyllo shows that
the operator of the thermal imager stated in his report that "the
thermal scan showed high heat loss from the roof [of Kyllo's
residence] above the garage and from the wall facing [the adjacent
180. See Whitebread, supra note 164, at 42 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
36 (2001)).
181. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
182. See, e.g., LAFAVE, supra note 150, at 76 (noting that the majority in Kyllo rightly
opted for taking the long view in addressing thermal-imaging and other technology-
enhanced surveillance techniques); cf. United States v. Myers, 46 F.3d 668, 670 n.1 (1995)
("While it is true that other technology may be, or may become so advanced that it could
unlawfully penetrate the walls of our homes or be otherwise unacceptably intrusive, this is
not the case before us.").
183. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
184. See Sean D. Thueson, Note, Fuzzy Shades of Gray: The New "Bright-Line" Rule
in Determining When the Use of Technology Constitutes a Search, 2 WYO. L. REV. 169, 201
(2002) (noting that the majority opinion in Kyllo fails to adhere to the principle of judicial
restraint).
185. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712 (noting that "[i]t is the exploitation of technological
advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence").
186. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1986); Karo, 468 U.S.
at 712.
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unit in the triplex]."'87 Based on these facts alone, the thermal scan
could not be inferred to reveal any intimate details of the interior of
the home. But the operator's testimony went on to describe that
" 'the main conclusion that I reached was that there was definitely
something unusual within the structure that was generating excess
heat.' "188 Thus, the Court was correct in holding that the thermal
scan was a search of the interior of the home, but it articulated an
overly broad rule by also including technology under development.
The Court in Kyllo also did not take into account the exceptions
enunciated in Katz for the reasonable expectation of privacy within
the home for things "knowingly exposed" to the outside world.'89
Kyllo took no affirmative action to conceal the heat emanating from
his house. 9' One could argue that he "knowingly exposed" the excess
heat to the public, and under the exception enunciated in Katz he
would no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that
heat. If the Court truly followed Katz, it would have at least noted
and addressed this exception. 9' Most of the lower courts adopted the
waste-heat doctrine.'92 The Court should have considered whether
the waste-heat approach fell within the "knowingly exposed"
exception under Katz. This exception, as applied to the facts of
Kyllo, is not as strained, for example, as the overhead surveillance
allowed in Ciraolo where the suspect had erected a ten-foot high
fence around his property.'93 By addressing the waste-heat doctrine
under the "knowingly exposed" exception provided in Katz, the
Court could have provided lower courts with a mechanism for
187. Kyllo v. United States, No. 92-51-FR, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3864, at *4 (D. Or.
March 15, 1996) (quoting Transcript, at 139), affd, 190 F. 3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd,
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
188. Id. (quoting Transcript, at 139) (emphasis added).
189. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
190. United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1305
(2000), rev'd and remanded, 258 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
191. Contra Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth Amendment:
Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV.
1393, 1417-18 (2002) (asserting that the proper inquiry is not the one posed by the
majority opinion in Katz, but rather the reasonable expectation of privacy test articulated
in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion).
192. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
193. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (concluding that the defendant's
expectation that his backyard was protected from observation from an airplane at an
altitude of 1,000 feet was unreasonable and not an expectation that society was prepared
to honor despite defendant's assertion that he did not "knowingly expose" his yard to
aerial viewing).
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distinguishing between suspects who actively vent the excess heat
19 4
and those, like Kyllo, who merely take no affirmative acts to conceal
the heat emanating from the structure. As it now stands, courts have
refused to make a distinction between these seemingly dissimilar
circumstances. 95
B. Kyllo Provides Fourth Amendment Protection from Technology-
Enhanced Surveillance of the Home Only
Kyllo has been hailed as a landmark case that will stand along
with the Warren Court's decision in Katz.'96 However, because it
restricts protection from technology-enhanced surveillance to the
home, the ruling in Kyllo is more limited than the general
proscription of electronic surveillance articulated in Katz.'97 The
Court's "emphasis on the home raise[s] the prospect that warrantless
imaging of other locations might be upheld."'1 98 .For example, under
this reasoning, the decision in Kyllo should not be applied to the
thermal-imaging surveillance of outbuildings or unoccupied structures
on private property. Thus, the lower court decisions in United States
v. Ishmael'99 and United States v. Ford"'0 in the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits, respectively, could hypotheticaily withstand scrutiny under
Kyllo.
201
By leaving open the question of whether technology-enhanced
searches in public places are legal, the Court in Kyllo assured citizens
194. See, e.g., United States v. Ford, 34 F.3d 992, 995 (11th Cir. 1994) (noting that the
defendant took affirmative actions to vent the excess heat generated by the grow lamps).
195. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
196. See Cole, supra note 163, at 7.
197. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967) (citing Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960)).
198. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say Warrant is Required in High-Tech Search of
Homes, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, at Al; see Heffernan, supra note 9, at 103 (concluding
that the best interpretation of Kyllo is that houses enjoy a "specially privileged position"
under the expectations of privacy test).
199. 48 F.3d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the surveillance of an underground
bunker in an open field with a thermal imager does not violate the Fourth Amendment),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995). The appeals court in Ishmael relied on Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984), which held that "an individual has no legitimate
expectation that open fields will remain free from warrantless intrusion by government
officers."
200. 34 F.3d 992, 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that surveillance of an unoccupied
mobile home with a thermal imager is not an unreasonable search).
201. The decision in Kyllo has already resulted in a reversal of a case in the Seventh
Circuit where thermal imaging was used to scan an occupied residence. See United States
v. Real Prop. Located at 15324 County Highway, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 19837 (7th Cir.
Sept. 4, 2001) (remanding an earlier decision to the District Court to reconsider the facts
in light of Kyllo).
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of their right to privacy in their homes from technology-enhanced
searches, but once individuals cross the "firm line at the entrance to
the house,"2 °2 they may leave many of their Fourth Amendment
rights behind. Even though the Court purports to follow Katz, it
ignores the majority holding of that case that the Fourth Amendment
protects "people, not places.""2 3 Thus, the Court failed to recognize
that Katz focused on an individual's expectations of privacy and
"signaled a dramatic shift away from location-specific privacy
protections."2°4 Viewed in this way, Kyllo marks a return to the pre-
Katz world, in which common law property principles governed
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.0 5 The Court in Kyllo, however,
discussed at length the traditional property-based concepts of the
Fourth Amendment but settled on following the more modern
approach in Katz.2"6
Although Kyllo can be criticized for limiting Fourth Amendment
protection from technology-enhanced surveillance to the home, the
Court was confronted with facts relating solely to the surveillance of
the home.20 7 As mentioned previously, the Court should consider
only the facts of the case at hand.20 8 Although the Court failed to
show restraint by including developing technologies in its decision, it
did properly limit its analysis of Kyllo to the home.
Expanding the rule in Kyllo to offer protection at other locations
would most likely result in "a watering-down of the protections
afforded the home rather than an upgrading of privacy as to
202. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
203. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); see also Fisher, supra note 6, at
169-70 (noting that the Court's emphasis on a physical location, i.e., the home, is at odds
with the long-recognized principle that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places); Quin M. Sorenson, Comment, Losing a Plain View of Katz: The Loss of a
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Under the Readily Available Standard, 107 DICK. L.
REV. 179, 195 (2002) (arguing that, although the Court in Kyllo recognizes the sanctity of
the home, the "in general public use" standard effectively compromises the protection
afforded activities in the home).
204. See Ku, supra note 145, at 1367 (arguing that limiting Kyllo to the interior of the
home runs counter to the true meaning of Katz and returns Fourth Amendment analysis
to Olmstead); Leading Cases, supra note 29, at 352 (suggesting that the Court's decision in
Kyllo indicates the possible return of Fourth Amendment doctrine to the concept of
physical trespass).
205. See Cole, supra note 163.
206. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-32.
207. See LAFAVE, supra note 150, at 80-81 (arguing that the Court in Kyllo decided
only the issue before the Court).
208. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 n.5 (1986).
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everything else. 2 °9 Kyllo should not be read as settling any issues
regarding technology-enhanced surveillance beyond the home. 10
Therefore, an application of the holding in Kyllo to surveillance not
involving the home would be erroneous.
C. The Court in Kyllo Adopts a Standard That Only Affords Fourth
Amendment Protection from Technology-Enhanced Surveillance
Devices That Are Not in General Public Use
The line of cases following Katz gradually eroded Fourth
Amendment rights against technology-enhanced surveillance."1 At
first blush, Kyllo appears to have attenuated, if not completely halted,
this erosion. In fact, the dissent in Kyllo asserts that the Court
formulates a new rule."' But, by limiting its holding to technology-
enhanced surveillance devices that are "not in general public use," '213
Kyllo actually falls in line with the visual surveillance cases following
Katz.2"4 In Ciraolo, the Court recognized that the government's use
of "routine" technology does not impose upon a reasonable
expectation of privacy.215 Also, the Court in Dow Chemical stated,
"[i]t may well be ... that surveillance of private property by using
highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not generally available to
the public ... might be constitutionally proscribed absent a
warrant." '216 Thus, although Kyllo purports to enhance Fourth
Amendment protection against technology-enhanced surveillance, it
has much in common with the Katz progeny that served to diminish
such protection.
As Justice Stevens articulated in his dissenting opinion, the
general use standard is "somewhat perverse because it seems likely
that the threat to privacy will grow, rather than recede, as the use of
209. See LAFAVE, supra note 150, at 80-81 (suggesting that the Court appropriately
left for another day whether the rule in Kyllo should apply to locations with a lower
expectation of privacy than the home).
210. Id.; see Heffernan, supra note 9, at 103-05.
211. See supra notes 80-82.
212. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 46-49 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 40.
214. See supra notes 83-94.
215. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 n.3 (1986).
216. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986). Dow Chemical cuts
both ways. The passage goes on to state that "the photographs here are not so revealing
of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns. Although they undoubtedly give the
EPA more detailed information than naked-eye views, they remain limited to an outline
of the facility's buildings and equipment." Id. Justice Scalia properly distinguished Kyllo
from Dow Chemical, because Dow Chemical involved an industrial site. See Kyllo, 533
U.S. at 33.
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intrusive equipment becomes more readily available." '217 The price of
thermal-imaging equipment is already dropping,"' and the use of
thermal imagers in law enforcement, fire fighting, and other public
safety applications is becoming more prevalent.219 One can imagine,
as thermal-imaging technology improves and becomes more compact
and cost-effective, its use will be more pervasive 220 and likely will
make its way into general public use. 21  For example, night-vision
technology that once was limited to military applications has become
popular for outdoor recreational use.222 If thermal-imaging devices
also take this route, the "not in general public use" standard could
217. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. See, e.g., American Night Vision from Excalibur Electric Optics, at http://www.
nightvis.com/site/prices/default.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (listing a hand-held thermal imager with a suggested retail price of
$7,995, which is almost half the price of its more sophisticated counterpart, and the
suggested retail price of a mobile surveillance system of $5,999).
219. Thermal imagers also are used in search and rescue operations to locate lost
persons. By detecting body heat, thermal imagers can locate persons even in thick
underbrush. See National Fire & Rescue, Q&A Forum: Thermal Imaging Cameras, at
http://www.nfrmag.com/backissues/MarApr2001/featurel.asp (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review) [hereinafter National Fire & Rescue.
220. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Campisi, Comment, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: The Constitutionality of Thermal Imaging, 46 VILL. L. REV. 241, 270-71
(2001) (noting that advances in technology and lower costs will make the use of thermal-
imaging surveillance more pervasive). For example, a night vision option using a small
thermal imager is available on selected Cadillac automobiles for $2,250.00. See http://
www.cadillac.com/cadillacjsp/models/deville/index.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
221. See Slobogin, supra note 191, at 1402-06 (providing possible definitions of the "in
general public use" standard, including the "Wal-Mart test," i.e., if a device is available at
Wal-Mart, or comparable retail outlets, the device is likely to be accessible by a large
segment of the public); see also People v. Katz, No. 224477, 2001 WL 1012114, at *2 n.4
(Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 4, 2001) (suggesting that devices sold at retail outlets may be in
"general public use").
222. See, e.g., ITT Industries, at http://www.ittnv.com/itt/Active/ConOtherPages/
orhome (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(presenting night-vision equipment for outdoor recreational use). Night-vision
equipment, such as binoculars and rifle scopes, operate on a different principle than do
thermal imagers. Katz, 2001 WL 1012114, at *2 n.4. Night-vision technology uses image
intensification or light amplification, which takes a small amount of ambient light in the
visible spectrum and converts the light energy into electrical energy, or electrons. See
How Night Vision Works, at http://www.ittnv.com/ittActive/ConLeftMenu/
HowNVWorks (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
These electrons are multiplied and then transmitted to a phosphor screen, which converts
the electrons into light energy, i.e., photons, that allows the viewer to see images. Id.; see
also Katz, 2001 WL 1012114, at *2 n.4 (classifying the use of night vision binoculars to
enhance visual images as different from thermal imagers, which detect "invisible heat"
levels).
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very soon undermine the Fourth Amendment protection that Kyllo
purportedly provides.223
The rule articulated in Kyllo would be acceptable if the Court
did not include the "in general public use" standard.224 Instead of
tying Fourth Amendment rights to whether a surveillance technology
is "in general public use," the Court should adopt a standard that is
grounded on fundamental rights against unreasonable searches.
225 If
the Court truly had followed the teaching of Katz, it would have
focused on the object of the government's intrusion-the interior of
the home-and not on the tools used by the government or the
phenomena measured by those tools.
226
Although the majority purports to take the "long view, ' 227 the
decision in this respect is rather shortsighted because technology
routinely outpaces the legal system.2 8 For example, the issue of the
constitutionality of the "search" in Kyllo first arose in 1992 but was
not resolved by the Supreme Court until 2001.229 Thermal-imaging
223. See Slobogin, supra note 191, at 1395 (noting that the dissent might be correct in
suggesting that the "in general public use" exception will eventually swallow the majority's
prohibition of technology-enhanced surveillance of the home).
224. See Simmons, supra note 72, at 1320 (noting, with approval, that the Court in
Kyllo, relied first on a "results-based test" by considering whether the device obtains
information that could not have been obtained without physical intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area, but, with disapproval, that the Court relied a "method-
based test" by adding the "in general public use" exception); Slobogin, supra note 191, at
1437 (concluding that the "in general public use" exception represents a "potentially huge
loophole[] in the Fourth Amendment's protection"). See generally, Douglas Adkins, The
Supreme Court Announces a Fourth Amendment "General Public Use" Standard for
Emerging Technologies but Fails to Define It: Kyllo v. United States, 27 DAYTON L. REV.
245 (2002) (providing criticism of the "in general public use" standard).
225. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) ("The Fourth Amendment is
to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when
it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests
and rights of individual citizens."); Bandes, supra note 9, at 1389-90 (noting the "in
general public use" rule will ultimately diminish privacy and whether a particular
technology has entered common use has little to do with how law enforcement should be
allowed to use it); Slobogin, supra note 191, at 1396 (arguing that the extent to which a
particular technological device is used by the general public should be irrelevant to a
Fourth Amendment analysis).
226. See United States v. Cusumano, 67 F.3d 1497, 1504 n.11 (10th Cir. 1995), vacated
on other grounds en banc by 83 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996); see also Simmons, supra note
72, at 1321-22 (arguing "the method of surveillance should be irrelevant and the results of
the surveillance are all that should matter in determining whether an individual's
reasonable expectation of privacy has been infringed").
227. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
228. See Slobogin, supra note 191, at 1412 (questioning how courts will deal with the
rapid pace of technological development in deciding whether something is "in general
public use").
229. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27.
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technology has improved significantly since the issue first arose in
Kyllo.23 ° The rule in Kyllo might not even offer protection against
thermal-imaging surveillance today given the pervasiveness and
availability of thermal-imaging equipment; at best Kyllo offers a
temporary reprieve from the governmental intrusion of technology-
enhanced surveillance.23' Certainly, if thermal imagers become
widely available to the general public, such as through retail
commercial outlets, their warrantless use by law enforcement would
not violate the Fourth Amendment under the standard articulated in
Kyllo.
232
V. APPLICATION OF KYLLO TO OTHER TECHNOLOGY-ENHANCED
SURVEILLANCE DEVICES
Current case law, including Kyllo, that addresses technology-
enhanced surveillance devices deals almost exclusively with thermal
imaging.233 Law enforcement is currently using or proposing to use
more sophisticated surveillance techniques, many of which have
general similarities to thermal imaging.234 The thermal-imaging cases,
therefore, may provide some insight into the direction the Court will
take with regard to the constitutionality of other high-technology
230. See National Fire & Rescue, supra note 219.
231. See Leading Cases, supra note 29, at 356 (concluding that Kyllo could reduce a
citizen's rights against unreasonable searches to pre-Katz levels). Professor LaFave,
however, does not give much weight to the "in general public use" standard in Kyllo and
suggests that this phrase was only a tentative qualification of the prohibition against
technology-enhanced surveillance. See LAFAVE, supra note 150, at 78 (arguing that the
Court does not assert that there is a general public use exception, but that its holding in
Kyllo applies at least where the technology is not in public use and that the Court reserved
this question for another day). He cautions, however, that "even the most tentatively
stated exceptions to a rule have a tendency to harden into immutable limitations with the
passage of time." Id. Support for this proposition comes from Dow Chemical, wherein
the Court held that the use of a $22,000 aerial-mapping camera came under this type of
general use exception. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239, 242 n.4
(1986). Therefore, even if the "in general public use" exception is applied to technology-
enhanced surveillance after Kyllo, Professor LaFave recommends that this exception
should be construed to mean more than the theoretical possibility that a member of the
public engaging in such surveillance undermines one's justified expectation of privacy. See
LAFAVE, supra note 150, at 79-80 (distinguishing Kyllo from Dow Chemical, where the
Court indicated that "any person" taking aerial photographs with a high-precision
mapping camera would diminish the expectation of privacy). This distinction should hold
even though many other non-law enforcement uses for thermal imagers, such as
firefighting and search and rescue operations, exist.
232. See Slobogin, supra note 191.
233. See Leading Cases, supra note 29.
234. See supra notes 9-17.
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surveillance devices.235 These devices may be characterized according
to the analogies that can be drawn between them and thermal
imaging, including (A) more sophisticated infrared devices that could
be used for surveillance purposes; (B) devices capable of conducting
surveillance of the home; and (C) technology-enhanced surveillance
devices for airport security.
A. More Sophisticated Infrared Devices
The ruling in Kyllo appears to prohibit the use of any
technology-enhanced surveillance device that can sense images,
sounds, or smells coming from a home, at least if the device is not in
general public use.236 This prohibition would likely include more
sophisticated infrared systems that could be used to detect and
identify chemical solvents, for example, emanating from an illegal
drug manufacturing laboratory.237 Such infrared devices are available
commercially,238 and, although these infrared devices are currently
used primarily for environmental and industrial hygiene
239monitoring, manufacturers of such devices list their use in drug
enforcement surveillance as a typical application. 4 °
The use of more sophisticated infrared technology in drug
enforcement operations would be distinguishable from the thermal
imagers used in Kyllo, because the thermal imager only provides
evidence of a temperature differential between the house and the
surroundings. One of the criticisms of thermal imaging is that this
temperature differential does not provide direct evidence of criminal
activity.24' Other activities within the home could give rise to the
235. See Dery, supra note 17, at 373-92.
236. See Savage, supra note 168.
237. Every chemical compound has a unique infrared spectrum, which is analogous to a
molecular fingerprint. See FrIR-Foreign Transform Infrared Spectroscopy, at, http://
www.wcaslab.com/tech/tbftir.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review). When coupled with an optical device, such as a monochromator
or an interferometer, that separates the wavelengths of light, an infrared detector can be
used to identify specific chemical compounds in the air. See George Russwurm & Jeffrey
Childers, Open-path Fourier Transform Infrared Spectroscopy, in 2 HANDBOOK OF
VIBRATIONAL SPECTROSCOPY 1750, 1751-53 (John M. Chalmers & Peter R. Griffiths
eds., 2002).
238. See, e.g., Block Engineering, at http://www.blockeng.com/ispec.htm (last visited
Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (describing the Block I-Spec
imaging spectrometer that could potentially be used in drug enforcement operations).
239. See Russwurm & Childers, supra note 237, at 1769-70.
240. See, e.g., Block Engineering, supra note 238 (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) (describing applications of the "I-SPEC" imaging spectrometer).
241. People v. Deutsch, 44 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1231 (1996) (noting that "because the
thermal imager is indiscriminate in registering sources of heat it is an intrusive tool, which
20031
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observed temperature differential.242 In contrast, the use of more
sophisticated infrared technology to detect specific solvents that are
not commonly used in the household for legal activities, but are used
in the manufacture of illegal drugs, could be direct evidence of
criminal activity.243 The information produced by such a device is
specific enough to eliminate any ambiguity regarding the source of
the detected activity.
A court addressing the use of more sophisticated infrared devices
would also have to consider whether the defendant had a subjective
expectation of privacy in the solvent vapors. That is, would the waste
doctrine adopted by the lower courts in thermal-imaging cases apply
in this situation?244 In analogous situations, the Court has held that
smoke rising from a chimney may be observed without a warrant.245
Solvent vapors, emanating from a house, however, might not be
visible without the aid of a technological device. Justice Stevens
addressed this point in his dissenting opinion, where he stated that in
the context of monitoring for public health reasons,
public officials should not have to avert their senses or their
equipment from detecting emissions in the public domain
such as excessive heat, traces of smoke, suspicious odors,
odorless gases, airborne particulates, or radioactive
emissions, any of which could identify hazards to the
community. In my judgment, monitoring such emissions
with "sense-enhancing technology" ... and drawing useful
conclusions from such monitoring, is an entirely reasonable
public service.246
tells much about the activities inside the home which may be quite unrelated to any illicit
activity").
242. Operating a sauna, hot tub, or clothes dryer could result in a thermal imager
recording a measurable temperature differential between rooms of a home. For example,
Justice Scalia speculated that a thermal imager could disclose "at what hour each night the
lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath .... Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
38 (2001).
243. See Heffernan, supra note 9, at 105 (noting that, under Place, technology that
accurately identifies contraband and does not produce false positives with respect to legal
activities is compatible with the Fourth Amendment).
244. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
245. See Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. W. Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861, 865 (1974)
(holding that a state health inspector may observe smoke plumes emitted from chimneys
without a warrant because "[h]e had sighted what anyone in the city who was near the
plant could see in the sky-plumes of smoke").
246. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (comparing the monitoring of
emissions from homes in a public health context to the reasonable belief articulated in
Greenwood that police are not expected to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal
activity).
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Under this reasoning, the ruling in Kyllo may not prevent the use of
passive infrared monitoring devices that provide specific information
regarding criminal activity in the home. Although Justice Stevens's
dissenting opinion specifically addresses the use of sense-enhancing
technology for monitoring hazardous air emissions as a "public
service, '247 under some circumstances polluters are subject to criminal
charges.2 48  Thus, the use of sophisticated infrared equipment to
monitor for criminal behavior, such as the manufacture of illegal
drugs, could also be deemed "entirely reasonable" under this
approach.
B. Other Technology-Enhanced Surveillance Devices for Monitoring
the Home
Thermal imagers and the more sophisticated infrared systems
described in the preceding section are passive devices-that is, they
do not emit rays or beams.2 49  The government is also developing
active surveillance devices, such as through-the-wall radar devices,
that emit radar waves that can penetrate solid objects.2 ' The Court in
Kyllo explicitly rejected the use of such through-the-wall technologies
for surveillance in the home. Interestingly, Justice Brennan foresaw
and disapproved of this type of technology almost twenty years ago. 2
The Court in Kyllo, however, did not proscribe the use of these
devices outside of the home, for example, in commercial buildings or
public places. A patrolling officer might carry one version of this
technology, a "radar flashlight," and use it to detect suspects hiding in
247. Id.
248. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c) (2000) (providing criminal penalties for violating
provisions of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments).
249. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
250. For information regarding technology projects under development, see generally
United States Department of Justice, National Law Enforcement and Corrections
Technology Center, Project Title: Radar Flashlight, at http://www.nlectc.org/virlib/ (last
visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
251. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 n.3.
252. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137-38 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Brennan stated:
[T]he Court adopts a general rule that a surveillance technique does not
constitute a search if it reveals only whether or not an individual possesses
contraband .... In fact, the Court's analysis is so unbounded that if a device
were developed that could detect, from the outside of a building, the presence of
cocaine inside, there would be no constitutional obstacle to the police cruising
through a residential neighborhood and using the device to identify all homes in
which the drug is present.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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buildings.253 One could imagine exigent circumstances, for example,
threats to officer safety254 or the need to pursue a fugitive, 55 where
the use of such devices might be allowed in surveillance of the home.
C. The Use of Technology-Enhanced Surveillance Devices for
Airport Security
Several technology-enhanced surveillance devices are being
proposed for use in airport security. Two such devices are X-ray
backscatter256  and milliwave scanner 257  technology. These
technologies are in current use or are being proposed for use in the
detection of contraband or weapons on persons or moving vehicles.258
X-ray backscatter devices can detect the presence of guns, drugs,
plastic explosives, and other contraband even when these items are
hidden in the middle of a fully-packed cargo truck.25 9  The U.S.
Customs Service currently uses truck-based X-ray inspection systems
along the Mexican border. 60 Customs officials at John F. Kennedy
International Airport have used a similar system that reveals images
253. See United States Department of Justice, National Law Enforcement and
Corrections Technology Center, Project Title: Radar Flashlight, at http://www.nlectc.org/
virlib/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (describing
a handheld radar flashlight device that would enable law enforcement officers to detect
individuals through interior building walls). Researchers expect radar flashlights to go on
the market sometime during 2002 and to be priced between $1,000 to $1,500. See Linda
Rothstein, Move Over, Superman, I've Got X-Ray Vision Too, BULL. OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, July/Aug. 2001, at 8 (discussing advances in high-tech surveillance
techniques).
254, See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that officers may make protective
searches for weapons).
255. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980) (holding that a warrantless
entry may be effected under exigent circumstances).
256. These surveillance devices use a technique in which images are made from X-rays
back-scattered from dense objects (as opposed to waves passing through them). See
AS&E, at http://www.as-e.com/technology/technology.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2003) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review)
257. See Dery supra note 17. The human body emits millimeter radiation that goes
through clothing. Id. Anything that blocks the emitted radiation, such as a gun, shows up
as a shadow in the images produced by the millimeter wave scanner. Id. The advantage of
this device over current "metal detectors" is that it can detect non-metallic objects,
including ceramics, that might be molded into a weapon and carried on a person. Id.
258. See AS&E, at http://www.as-e.com/products/products.html (last visited Jan. 5,
2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
259. See id. (describing the "MobileSearch Inspection System," a truck-mounted
mobile X-ray detection system for inspecting containers, vehicles, or any large items).
260. Ivan Amato, X-ray Vision; a Surprising Supreme Court Ruling Sheds Light-and
Other Beams-on the Latest Snooping Technology; TIME, June 25, 2001, at 57.
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of weapons underneath one's clothing"' to search for contraband on
persons.262 The Federal Aviation Administration has purchased five
X-ray backscatter systems for testing.
263
Technology-enhanced surveillance devices that detect radiation
in the millimeter wavelength range are also being developed to
replace or augment metal detectors for use in airport security.264
These devices are also capable of detecting people and objects
through walls.261 One such device, dubbed "Millivision," is a passive
system that measures naturally-occurring electromagnetic waves
produced by the objects, including people, being viewed.166  The
device can be used to conduct "remote frisks" for weapons or
contraband on individuals or as a gateway scanner.267 The proposed
use of Millivision devices to search persons for concealed weapons or
contraband has raised Fourth Amendment concerns. 68
The decision in Kyllo would not apply to the use of technology-
enhanced surveillance devices proposed for use in airport security for
several reasons: (1) their proposed use is not for the surveillance of a
home; (2) similar screening devices are already in general public use;
261. See AS&E BodySearch Personnel Inspectin System, supra note 12 (describing the
"BodySearch Personnel Inspection System" for screening individuals for the presence of
concealed weapons, drugs, and illegal contraband).
262. Kathryn R. Urbonya, Projecting an Image: Court to Decide If High-tech Heat
Scan Is a Search Under the Fourth, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2000, at 38 (noting that "[t]he more we
use technology, the fewer secrets we have").
263. See Snider, supra note 10.
264. See Murray, supra note 13, at 112. Like thermal imagers, these systems measure
thermal emissions from an object. Id. A human body emits a signature radiation in the
millimeter wavelength range, which lies between microwaves and infrared radiation. Id.
The manufacturer of such systems, Millivision LLC, in Amherst, Massachusetts, offers
three types of systems: a portable unit the size of a radar gun, a gateway scanner, and a
video-surveillance type camera unit. Id.
265. See Peter Eggleston, Video Meets Vision: A System That "Sees" Through Walls!,
ADVANCED IMAGING, Mar. 1, 2000, at 10 (describing how the Millivision system
operates). Millimeter frequencies are capable of penetrating building materials. Id.
Human bodies have a high emissivity for radiation in this part of the spectrum, whereas
metals, plastics and ceramics do not. Id. Therefore, these objects appear as a shadow
against a bright image of a human body. Id.
266. See Bruce Wiebusch, New-Wave Detectors; Millimeter Waves Could Detect More
Weapons-and Speed Security Checks at Airports, DESIGN NEWS, Sept. 4, 2000, at 73
(describing the development of the Millivision system for airport security).
267. See Dery, supra note 17, at 357-58 (discussing potential applications of the
Millivision technology); see also Murray, supra note 13 (discussing millimeter-wave
technology used for airport screening).
268. See Alyson L. Rosenberg, Comment, Passive Millimeter Wave Imaging: A New
Weapon in the Fight Against Crime or a Fourth Amendment Violation?, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 135, 158 (1998) (advocating application of a "reasonable suspicion" standard for
use of the Millivision device to search for weapons and a higher standard of "reasonably
likely" to search for contraband).
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and (3) society, especially in the current climate of increased airport
security, would most likely accept such searches as reasonable.
Courts have sustained the practice of requiring all persons entering
the gate areas of airports to submit to electronic searches of
themselves and their possessions. 69 The one drawback with these
sophisticated screening devices is that, in their current configurations
and operating conditions, they display the shape of anatomical
features.270 In that regard, the public may not be willing to accept
such searches as reasonable unless the manufacturers or entities that
are conducting the searches can devise a way to protect such
"private" information.
CONCLUSION
Technological innovations generally outpace growth in the law.
The "in general public use" reasonableness standard articulated in
Kyllo is fluid and will change with advances in technology. By
adopting this standard, the Court ensured that it will revisit high-
technology surveillance issues in the not-so-distant future. Rather
than building upon the precedent established in Katz and using the
opportunity in Kyllo to demarcate fundamental Fourth Amendment
rights to privacy, the Court tied this standard to the current state of
technology. Law enforcement only has to wait until a particular
surveillance device becomes ubiquitous. If everybody owns a version
of the surveillance device, then nobody will have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, even in the home. In the end, by expressly
limiting its protection to homes, Kyllo stands for the proposition that
"[a] man's home may be his castle, but ... the streets still belong to
the police."27'
JEFFREY W. CHILDERS
269. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 905 n.32, 912 (9th Cir. 1973).
270. See Dery, supra note 17, at 356-57 (describing Millivision's ability to "see"
through clothing and display the shape of the subject's body).
271. Cole, supra note 163, at 7.
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